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Abstract: Prices are a significant driver of health care cost in the United
States. Existing research on the politics of health system reform has
emphasized the limited nature of policy entrepreneurs’ efforts at solving the
problem of rising prices through direct regulation at the state level. Yet this
literature fails to account for how change agents in the states gradually
reconfigured the politics of prices, forging new, transparency-based policy
instruments called all-payer claims databases (APCDs), which are designed to
empower consumers, purchasers, and states to make informed market and
policy choices. Drawing on pragmatist institutional theory, this article shows
how APCDs emerged as the dominant model for reforming health care prices.
While APCD advocates faced significant institutional barriers to policy change,
we show how they reconfigured existing ideas, tactical repertoires, and legaltechnical infrastructures to develop a politically and technologically robust
reform. Our analysis has important implications for theories of how change
agents overcome structural barriers to health reform.
Keywords: health care, transparency, all-payer claims databases,
federalism, United States

The United States spends more on health care, as both a
percentage of GDP and on a per capita basis, than any other country.
In 2009, the year before the adoption of the Patient Protection and
Affordable Care Act (ACA), health care spending in the United States
was nearly $8,000 per capita, about $3,000 more than its closest
competitor, Norway (Squires 2012).1 While numerous factors have
contributed to this increase—including rapid growth in utilization for
popular and expensive diagnostic and therapeutic services—recent
evidence has suggested that health care prices are a particularly
important, and often overlooked, cause (Oberlander and White 2009;
Laugesen and Glied 2011; Reinhardt 2012; Bai and Anderson 2015).
In the private marketplace, responses to the problem of rising prices
have been limited. As historical accounts suggest, policy innovations
intended to more stringently standardize prices paid for health services
have found greater traction within Medicare and Medicaid, while statelevel regulatory frameworks governing the commercial marketplace
had weak institutional and political footing and were largely dismantled
by the early 2000s (McDonough 1997a, b; Hackey 1998).
While the existing literature helps to explain the failure of older
regulatory frameworks, it cannot account for a significant shift in the
ideas, interests, and institutions that dominate this policy arena (Sage
1999). In recent years, advocates of health care reform have
embraced transparency instruments such as the Physician Compare
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website, which requires the public posting of information about the
number and type of services delivered by physicians as well as how
much Medicare paid them for services (Somashekhar 2014). In the
private marketplace, however, a central trend has been a convergence
around a model of state-level all-payer claims databases (APCDs) that
aim to empower consumers, purchasers, and government officials to
make informed market and policy choices (CPR 2014). To explain the
emergence of APCDs, we draw on ideas from pragmatist institutional
theory, which argues that agents of change facing significant
institutional constraints often respond by developing the existing
knowledge base about potentially viable policy ideas, tactics, and
institutional infrastructures, and repurpose these “raw materials” to
serve new goals. As we show in this article, organized proponents of
APCDs retooled existing policy ideas about when and where
transparency works; repurposed tactical repertoires for state-level
coalition building and policy formation; and reassembled
infrastructures for data collection that began to develop in the mid1980s as the result of efforts by the National Association of Health
Data Organizations (NAHDO). APCD advocates used these existing
ideas, coalitions, and infrastructures in new ways—greatly expanding
the scope and substance of state transparency measures beyond what
existed in the past. As a result of these efforts, APCDs have become a
dominant model for controlling rising medical costs across the fifty
states.
The article proceeds as follows. First, we review the existing
literature on health prices as a policy problem and the response of
state and federal governments. Second, we introduce our argument
about institutional reconfiguration and contrast it with the existing
literature, which cannot account for the emergence of APCDs. Third,
we test our argument by examining evidence on state innovations in
the area of price transparency, which began to emerge in the 1980s.
We conclude by suggesting that the emergence of APCDs has
important implications both for how we think about the conditions
under which state governments can become sites of innovation and for
the value of pragmatist institutional theory for explaining policy
change in the US context (Stone 1997; Barrilleaux and Brace 2007;
Sparer, France, and Clinton 2011; Gray, Lowery, and Benz 2013;
Heller, Hoffman, and Bindman 2014; Studlar 2014).
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Health Care Prices as a Policy Problem
Despite the recent deceleration of health care spending in the
United States, health care expenditures have grown dramatically since
the 1970s. By 1980, per capita health spending in the United States
was already much higher than in other advanced industrial countries,
at over $1,000 a year (in constant dollars), an amount that more than
quadrupled by 1995 (Squires 2012: 2). Twenty years later, in 2015,
per capita spending was set to reach $10,000 (Munro 2015). Recent
data from the OECD shows that the provision of services in the United
States is generally comparable to that of other countries, suggesting
that the key component of the United States’ outsized spending is the
rising prices for services (Bai and Anderson 2015). As Laugesen and
Glied (2011) suggest, primary care physicians in the United States are
paid higher fees for office visits in 2009 ($60 for public payers and
$133 for private payers) than their peers in other OECD countries such
as Australia, where the fee for office visits is between $34 for public
payers and $45 for private payers (see also Glied, Ma, and Pearlstein
2015). The prices typically paid for services and those negotiated with
providers have remained proprietary trade secrets (Reinhardt 2006).
Equally important, there is now widespread evidence of price
discrimination: charges for identical services vary significantly by
hospital and within hospital by payer (Frakt 2011; Bai and Anderson
2015).
The pattern of high and opaque health care prices did not
emerge in the absence of determined efforts by public and private
payers. To reform payments in the Medicare program, the Reagan
Administration—under advisement by Secretary of Health and Human
Services Richard Schweiker—adapted the idea of diagnosis-related
groups (DRGs) from New Jersey's hospital prospective payment model
(Mayes 2007; Goldfield 2010). By setting prices in advance of
admissions, hospitals assumed financial risk for their costs and, as a
result, learned how to reduce cost drivers such as long hospital stays
(Guterman et al. 1988). To address rising spending in Medicare in the
1990s, Congress also passed the Balanced Budget Act of 1997, which
eliminated retrospective payment for numerous services, including
post-acute care (Vladeck 2004). Private payers, by contrast, have had
weaker policy tools at their disposal. In the early 1990s, private payers
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took a managed-care approach to control costs in the form of networkbased contracting, forcing hospitals to negotiate on prices in exchange
for inclusion in insurers’ networks (Frakt 2011). Yet, by the end of the
decade, the unpopularity of these policies with consumers created
pressure for state and federal reforms that led to less restrictive
network contracting, giving hospitals greater negotiating power on
prices (Blendon et al. 1998). As figure 1 shows, while aggregate
hospital payment-to-cost ratios for Medicare and Medicaid fell below
the 100 percent “break-even” mark in the early 2000s, private payers
were still well above that mark, by 15 to 30 percent.

Figure 1. Aggregate Hospital Payment-to-Cost Ratio, 1993–2013
Source: AHA (2014a)
Note: Medicare and Medicaid trends include payments to disproportionate share
hospitals.

Understanding State Efforts to Govern Health
Prices
The existing literature on how policy makers have attempted to
govern health prices in the United States often focuses on explaining
the failure of state efforts to directly regulate the private marketplace.
In short, this literature effectively shows that institutional and political
constraints at the state level led to the breakdown of rate-setting
regimes. Attempts at controlling prices charged to private insurers
have, historically speaking, fared poorly compared to reforms within
public programs, and even efforts in the public sphere have been less
than robust. In the 1970s and 1980s, 15 states developed systems for
hospital rate regulation (McDonough 1997a, b; Hackey 1998).
Congress also encouraged this practice through Medicaid
demonstration programs that allowed states to hire actuarial
consultants to develop rates for use in capitated case management
programs (Freund and Hurley 1987).
Journal of Health Politics, Policy and Law, Vol 42, No. 1 (February 2017): pg. 5-52. DOI. This article is © Duke University
Press and permission has been granted for this version to appear in e-Publications@Marquette. Duke University Press
does not grant permission for this article to be further copied/distributed or hosted elsewhere without the express
permission from Duke University Press.

5

NOT THE PUBLISHED VERSION; this is the author’s final, peer-reviewed manuscript. The published version may be
accessed by following the link in the citation at the bottom of the page.

Yet, despite these investments, rate-setting regimes relied on
weak institutional foundations. State governments had limited capacity
to police regulated parties who frequently dodged rate-setting rules
and requirements. As Hackey (1998) shows, budget cuts, staff
shortages, and high rates of turnover made it nearly impossible for
Massachusetts to address significant problems and criticisms in a
cumbersome rate-setting system. This helped to undermine support
for rate setting and emboldened the state's hospital association, which
opposed the policy. In other cases, procedural weaknesses and policy
complexity enabled regulated parties to capture and manipulate
regulatory systems to their own advantage. McDonough quotes a New
Jersey insurance official as comparing the state's rate-setting system
to “a methadone program, a guaranteed bottom line every year, and
no one could understand how it worked” (1997b: 114). Given these
institutional weaknesses, state rate-setting institutions did not create
strong policy legacies; in most states, no strong constituency emerged
to defend rate setting against the tide of deregulatory pressures that
mounted in the 1980s (McDonough 1997a; Melhado 2006). Such
regimes only persist in Maryland and West Virginia (see table 1). In
short, states were infertile ground for significant reforms to cope with
rising health care prices and their future role in this arena would be
sharply limited.
Table 1. APCDs in States That Conducted Hospital-Based Rate Setting
States with Rate-Setting Regimes

APCD?

Arizona

No

Connecticut

Yes

Florida

No

Maine

Yes

Maryland*

Yes

Massachusetts

Yes

Minnesota

Yes

New Jersey

No

New York

Yes

Oregon

Yes

Rhode Island

Yes

Vermont

Yes

Washington

Yes

West Virginia*

Yes

Wisconsin

Yes
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Source: McDonough (1997a, b); Murray and Berenson (2015). ↵Note:
regime still in existence.

*

Rate-setting

What Existing Accounts Miss: The Rise of
Transparency Instruments
While the weakness of state institutions helps to explain the
breakdown of rate-setting regimes, it cannot account for the
emergence of a new regime oriented around transparency-based
policy instruments rather than regulatory tools (Sage 1999).2 As figure
2 shows, since the early 2000s, an increasing number of state
governments have converged on all-payer claims databases (APCDs),
data systems that provide comprehensive information on a wide range
of health costs, quality, and outcomes, including prices paid for
services (Love, Paita, and Custer 2001). All-payer claims databases,
which seek to address gaps in information that consumers, purchasers,
and policy makers have about the prices and quality of health services,
are becoming dominant in states that once had rate-setting systems.
Table 1 suggests that, among the fifteen states that once conducted
some form of rate setting, all but three are currently employing an
APCD model.

Figure 2. APCD Development in the States, 2009–2015. Sources: NHIHPP (2009);
Love (2011); Love and Sachs (2013); APCD Council (2015)

The APCD model was principally developed by members of the
New England-based Regional All-Payer Health Information Council
(RAPHIC), founded in 2007 and renamed the APCD Council in 2010
(NHIHPP 2009). Whereas existing data sources focused on charged
amounts for health care services, RAPHIC's initial work developed tools
to bundle together fine-grained data on health encounters that create
a claim for payment. Since claims data are typically buried in the
administrative databases of hospitals, insurance plans, and state
governments, APCDs represent a technologically sophisticated
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approach to integrating information from a variety of sources to enable
consumers, purchasers, and policy makers to make valid comparisons
in the costs, quality, and utilization of health care across providers
(SHADAC 2011). For instance, states such as Colorado have used
APCD data to provide consumers with information about how the cost
of procedures varies across acute care hospitals and other medical
facilities (CIVHC 2015). New Hampshire's APCD has repackaged this
data into a website that allows consumers to compare provider prices
and quality for common health services such as hip replacements and
births (Porter et al. 2014). States such as Maine and Massachusetts
have also deployed their data to empower employers to better
understand the causes of variation in the cost and utilization of
services, and to adjust their purchasing decisions accordingly (Porter
et al. 2014).
As a policy instrument for addressing the problem of health care
prices, the APCD has three distinctive characteristics. First, it relies on
a particular set of policy ideas (Campbell 2004). Major proponents of
APCDs embrace a specific narrative about the causes of high costs and
low quality in the marketplace for health services. In this narrative,
private information about the true prices paid for services and the
quality of services gives those who provide care a significant
bargaining advantage over purchasers, consumers, and policy makers.
Yet, addressing these information asymmetries requires information
that is tailored to the diverse needs of consumers, purchasers, and
policy makers. As employer groups such as Catalyst for Payment
Reform put it, APCDs produce information that is essential for
purchasers to implement “a variety of cost containment strategies,
including care management of high-cost patients, reference pricing,
centers of excellence for high-cost, complex services, and other
strategies including wellness incentives and more extensive coverage
of preventive care” (Delbanco 2014). Similarly, consumer groups who
support APCDs such as Families USA argue that information on prices
and the quality of services is essential for prudent purchasing, often
citing research that shows consumers are more likely to select highvalue care when they have access to easily interpretable information
on price and quality (Families USA 2014). Finally, groups representing
state-level policy makers—including the National Governors
Association (NGA) and the National Conference of State Legislatures
(NCSL)—have embraced APCDs as a means of enhancing cost control
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within Medicaid programs and other innovative health care models, as
well as monitoring and improving population health (NGA et al. 2015).
Second, the main organization supporting these policies, the
APCD Council, uses a distinctive tactical repertoire to overcome weak
state capacity and opposition to policy change (Tilly 1986). At the core
of this repertoire is a commitment to “articulating and communicating
the purpose of the APCD to multiple cross-cutting stakeholders, often
elaborating uses that extend beyond price transparency” (APCD
Council 2015: 5). Policy entrepreneurs define a rationale and purpose
for APCDs through a “robust stakeholder engagement process” which
links payers, providers, consumers, and state officials together to
collectively define a shared vision and infrastructure for the database—
and to build support for multiple uses of the APCD beyond price
transparency itself (APCD Council 2015). To address weak policy
capacity in the states, the APCD Council also facilitates external
capacity borrowing by seeking grants and guidance from federal
agencies such as the Agency for Healthcare Research and Quality
(AHRQ); seeking policy input from the Accredited Standards
Committee X12 (ASC X12); and securing support from state-based
organizations such as the NGA and the National Association of
Insurance Commissioners (NAIC) (Love 2011).3 Finally, to deal with
potential opposition to APCDs in the states, the Council builds evidence
from existing examples of policy implementation, demonstrating the
costs of interstate policy inconsistencies and the benefits of the APCD
model (see, e.g., Elliott, Ackerman, and Millian 1985; Kelemen 2004).
Third, APCDs run on a unique legal and technical infrastructure
that transforms raw administrative data into calculable information
about health care prices and outcomes (Bowker and Star 1999;
Muniesa 2007). This infrastructure is made up of both state laws that
mandate the disclosure of health data across multiple payers and care
settings as well as data systems and organizations which allow states
to collect and store information on prices paid for services. Existing
sources of data on health care, such as hospital discharge data sets,
the Medical Expenditure Panel Survey, and administrative data tend to
be limited by a patient population or the point of care where data is
gathered (Miller et al. 2010). By contrast, APCDs gather data on health
care claims from across the commercial marketplace, public programs,
and a wide range of care settings. As table 2 shows, in states such as
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Colorado, APCDs capture any bill or claim relating to a third-party
payer, and only lack data on services provided free of charge or
charged to individuals directly, without the involvement of an insurer.
Table 2: Information Typically Collected by Colorado's APCD
Encrypted member identification code

Pharmacy claims information

Patient demographics

Revenue codes

Location of services and facility type

Type of health plan

Service dates

Type of contract

Information on service provider

Health plan payment

Diagnosis, procedure, and national drug codes

Type and date of bill paid
Member payment responsibility

Source: APCD Council (2015)

Accounting for the Emergence of APCDs: Insights
from Pragmatist Institutional Theory
The existing literature on the limited success of state efforts to
govern health care prices is consistent with a broader finding in
historical-institutionalist research on health care reform, which
emphasizes how structural factors constrain policy development and
implementation of public policy (e.g., Steinmo and Watts 1995). Yet,
by focusing on how weak state capacity limited regulatory policy, the
existing literature cannot account for how policy entrepreneurs
developed the kind of policy expertise and political skill necessary to
generate a new model of reform like the APCD. This is especially
difficult given that policy expertise is scarce in many states and costly
to develop (Barrilleaux and Brace 2007; Evans 2011), and that statelevel entrepreneurs often face entrenched opposition (Schneider,
Teske, and Mintrom 2011; Gray, Lowery, and Benz 2013).
To explain the emergence of APCDs, we borrow insights from
what Ansell (2011) refers to as pragmatist institutional theory, a
perspective that emphasizes the tracing of how people actually
experience institutional rules (in our case, procedurally weak state
agencies with few resources available to govern health care prices). As
Berk and Galvan (2013), Herrera (2013), and Amberg (2013) have
argued, institutions have no agency of their own, either to hamper or
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enable policy change agents. Rather, they are bundles of raw materials
“available for creative reinterpretation or recombination” by change
agents (Berk and Galvan 2013: 29). Even when agents lack formal
authority or clear capacity to initiate policy changes, they use available
institutions and resources in unintended ways to achieve their goals.
Unlike entrepreneurs in Kingdon's (1984) “multiple streams model,”
such agents do not use “off the shelf” ideas, institutions, or
infrastructures “as is.” Rather, they reassemble those “raw materials”
for new purposes (Dorf and Sabel 1998; Campbell 2004; Carstensen
2011; Amberg 2013).4 For instance, Epstein (1996) shows how
politically weak AIDS activists strategically repurposed existing
institutional elements such as clinical trials and federally funded
research projects to press a recalcitrant Food and Drug Administration
(FDA) for expanded access to experimental treatments. While the FDA
had the formal authority to shape the rules on access to experimental
treatments, AIDS activists cobbled together resources and institutional
processes at hand, resulting in a successful challenge to powerful
bureaucratic actors (Epstein 1996).
Taken together, these empirical studies characterize a process
we refer to as institutional reconfiguration, in which policy
entrepreneurs creatively recombine existing institutional resources to
develop new ideas, tactical repertoires, and infrastructures to
challenge existing policies.5 Especially given the politically fraught
legacy of rate setting, we argue that APCDs are likely to have emerged
from such a process. There are three empirical implications of our
argument. First, to develop their arguments about the value of APCDs,
state-level advocates of APCDs should creatively repurpose existing
ideas from experts and public officials about the value of accurate
information on the cost and quality of health care, both for correcting
market failures and empowering policy makers and citizens to take
more decisive action. Second, APCD advocates should build upon
existing tactical repertoires for developing diverse support coalitions
made up of consumers, purchasers, and policy makers at multiple
levels of government. Third, we expect APCD advocates to construct
new policy models by using existing legal and technical infrastructures,
including pre-existing state laws, health information databases, and
administrative organizations. By contrast, if agents are capable of
creating APCDs with little political or institutional friction, and without
relying extensively on existing ideas, infrastructures, or tactical
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repertoires, it is unlikely that reconfiguration accounts for the
emergence of claims databases.

Data and Methods
To test our claim about the emergence of APCDs, we collected
and analyzed documents published by the APCD Council (N=33),
including manuals, issue briefs, PowerPoint presentations, and
webinars.6 From these documents, we developed a list of ideas,
tactical repertoires, and legal-technical infrastructures critical to the
development of APCDs. Second, we used the documents to assemble a
list of key actors and events in the development of the APCD model,
and supplemented our initial document analysis by examining publicly
available APCD Council meeting minutes, secondary literature, and
government reports. Finally, we conducted background interviews with
two key informants who participated in the founding of the APCD
Council. These interviews helped to confirm key features of our
narrative and fill in gaps where necessary.

Institutional Reconfiguration and the Emergence
of All-Payer Claims Databases
In this section, we present the results of our analysis. We begin
by describing the formation of the APCD Council and how a preexisting
network of health data policy experts informed the Council's policy
ideas and strategies. In particular, members of the National
Association of Health Data Organizations (NAHDO) were pivotal in
providing the APCD Council with three important “raw materials” it
reconfigured to develop its core policy model. As the sections that
follow show, the APCD Council built its model for transparency reform
by retooling existing policy ideas, repurposing existing tactical
repertoires, and reassembling legal and technical infrastructures. We
conclude the section by discussing how the Council's efforts have
expanded the constituency for, and uses of, health data transparency
as a policy instrument.

NAHDO as a Source of “Raw Materials” for APCDs
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All-payer claims databases first emerged in the early 2000s,
resulting from the efforts of state officials in Maine, Massachusetts,
and New Hampshire, as well as the University of New Hampshire's
Institute for Health Policy and Practice (NHIHPP 2009). To develop and
diffuse their policy instrument of choice, APCD advocates reconfigured
ideas, infrastructures, and tactical repertoires that had existed since
the 1980s. What made it possible for APCD advocates to borrow and
repurpose these existing “raw materials” is their relationship to a
network of policy experts at NAHDO, an organization with a long track
record in the area of health data policy, whose members well
understood the potential and limits of existing information-oriented
policy solutions (Love and Rudolph 2012).
Soon after transparency advocates in New England formed the
Regional All-Payer Health Information Council (RAPHIC), RAPHIC's Al
Prysunka, Craig Schneider, and Patrick Miller sought out the help of
NAHDO's Executive Director, Denise Love (Love 2008; Schneider and
Shah 2008; NHIHPP 2009). Reaching out to Love made a great deal of
sense; by the early 2000s, NAHDO was the principal champion of
health data transparency in the United States. Founded during a 1986
meeting sponsored by the Washington Business Group on Health, the
Agency for Health Care Policy and Research, and George Washington
University's Intergovernmental Health Policy Project, NAHDO had long
“supported activities of state-level agencies that are mandated to
collect, disseminate, and use hospital discharge datasets” and efforts
to increase “the uniformity of the [health] data being collected, its
coding, and accessibility” (NAHDO 2015). As NAHDO framed it, the
purpose of these data initiatives went far beyond price transparency
alone. Rather, NAHDO advocated for a variety of policies that
encouraged health care purchasers to base their decisions on price and
quality rather than cost (NAHDO 1988). As later sections will reveal,
this broad framing was essential to NAHDO's ability to build coalitions
(Overman and Cahill 1994).
In April 2008, NAHDO's network ties began to pay off for APCD
advocates when the organization secured a grant from the
Commonwealth Fund to stage the first National All-Payer Claims
Database Conference, which was attended by representatives from
more than twenty states, as well as federal agencies, universities,
hospitals, health plans, and purchasers (NHIHPP 2009: 5). During her
Journal of Health Politics, Policy and Law, Vol 42, No. 1 (February 2017): pg. 5-52. DOI. This article is © Duke University
Press and permission has been granted for this version to appear in e-Publications@Marquette. Duke University Press
does not grant permission for this article to be further copied/distributed or hosted elsewhere without the express
permission from Duke University Press.

13

NOT THE PUBLISHED VERSION; this is the author’s final, peer-reviewed manuscript. The published version may be
accessed by following the link in the citation at the bottom of the page.

introductory remarks at the conference, Denise Love explained that
NAHDO had been “dedicated to the improvement and public
availability of health care data since 1986” and, since then, had
developed extensive organizational expertise (Love 2008). By
coordinating national meetings of state data organizations, Love
suggested, NAHDO had helped advocates of transparency reform to
learn from and build on successful past efforts:
We've got several states who have figured this out, so let's get
them all in a room and, you know, don't reinvent the wheel and
get those states who have to ramp up quickly to pick the brains
of those that know how to do it . . . I think as we've seen with
hospital data we get some states that figure it out. They give
the lessons learned to the other states who figure out new
things, and we keep that sharing and we keep that loop going.
(Love 2008)
With NAHDO's help, RAPHIC's membership quickly grew beyond
New England to include states as far west as Utah and Hawaii; the
organization soon renamed itself the APCD Council (APCD Council
2015). Yet, the Council relied on NAHDO for more than growing its
membership. Rather, members of the APCD Council began to draw on
NAHDO's extensive knowledge of health data policy. As an example of
this process in action, table 3 assesses NAHDO coauthorship of publicly
available APCD Council reports. Of 33 APCD Council documents, 22 (67
percent) were coauthored by at least one member of NAHDO. As the
following sections suggests, APCD advocates did not build health data
reforms from scratch. Rather, with help from NAHDO, they repurposed
existing ideas, infrastructures, and tactical repertoires to build reforms
that were more politically and institutionally robust.
Table 3. NAHDO/APCD Council Coauthorships
Documents with At Least One APCD
Council Coauthor

No. (%) of Documents with
NAHDO Coauthor

Manual/guidebook (N = 6)

6 (100%)

Analysis of past APCD efforts (N = 4)

4 (100%)

Issue brief or fact sheet (N = 9)

4 (44%)

Webinars (N = 11)

6 (55%)

Other (N = 3)

2 (67%)

Total (N = 33)
Source: Authors’ analysis; see appendix

22 (67%)
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Note: Excludes twenty-seven documents published on site without at least one APCD
Council coauthor.

Reshaping Health Data Policy Ideas:
Dissemination and Integration
NAHDO was founded at the high point of market-oriented ideas
in health policy (Overman and Cahill 1994; Sage 1999).7 Since the
initial Medicare “cost crisis” of the early 1970s, reformers in successive
presidential administrations had embraced the ideal of “properly
functioning medical markets,” in which “providers would race to win
consumers, lowering costs and raising quality” (Morone 1988: 106).
Adherents of the “competitive markets” approach argued that, in order
to improve payers’ and consumers’ ability to buy low-cost and highquality services, government agencies had to collect better information
(Enthoven 1978; Kronick 1992; Osborne and Gaebler 1992). With the
creation of the Agency for Health Care Policy and Research (AHCPR)—
later renamed the Agency for Healthcare Research and Quality
(AHRQ)—in 1989, reformers also embraced the collection of data to
support the development of clinical guidelines, which they argued
would control costs by reducing the inappropriate use of health care
services (Grogan et al. 1994). Indeed, by 1988, NAHDO documents
also argued that government should develop information-collection
and dissemination policies to ensure that “price and quality, in addition
to cost” would become core purchasing criteria for health care (NAHDO
1988).
To develop a rationale for APCDs, members of the Council
worked with NAHDO leadership to reconfigure two policy ideas about
how enhanced collection and dissemination of health data, as opposed
to direct regulation, could improve the quality and cost of health care
(see table 4 for summary). First, APCD advocates helped to reshape
NAHDO ideas about the value of information. As NAHDO leadership
observed the results of health data reforms, they began to develop a
more specific understanding of how and when information might work.
For example, a 2001 Health Services Research article coauthored by
Denise Love, NAHDO Deputy Director Luis Paita, and health services
researcher William S. Custer argued that transparency reforms could
only improve competition in health markets when they provided
“economic value to purchasers and providers” by delivering
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information that “strengthens their decision making in a timely manner
in formats that are relevant to their users” (Love, Paita, and Custer
2001: 286). Without up-to-date information on medical errors and the
costs associated with them, for example, it would be difficult for
purchasers to make decisions to shape benefit plans. Moreover,
transparency programs were more likely to be successful when
providers and purchasers had “financial incentives for participation” in
data collection and use (Love, Paita, and Custer 2001: 286).
Table 4. Ideas Reconfigured by APCD Council
“Raw Material”

Influence on APCD
Development

How APCD Council
Reconfigured

Information, as
opposed to direct
regulation, can be a
tool for health care
reform.

Rationale for government
action on health care cost
and quality without direct
rate setting.

Created data products and
dissemination strategies that
better reflected needs and
incentive structures of endusers.

Databases are a key
information-based
policy instrument.

Conceptual model for
policy.

Defined approach to data
integration to address data gaps,
need for standardization, and
appropriate indicators.

All-payer claims database advocates drew on and gradually
reshaped this idea. At the first RAPHIC/NAHDO–hosted conference,
New Hampshire officials Tyler Brannen and Andrew Chalsma gave
examples of how their agencies were working to develop products
tailored to consumers, purchasers, and providers (Brannen 2008;
Chalsma 2008). Soon, Colorado adapted the idea by allowing
“providers, purchasers, researchers, and other organizations” to
request “limited custom reports and data sets to support the Triple
Aim of improving care for individuals, improving health for populations,
and lowering costs” (CIVHC 2015: 26–27).
Yet, as leaders of NAHDO and the Council put it in an issue
brief, political opposition to the release of some payment data on the
part of some insurers and providers—who viewed some kinds of
payment information as proprietary—made customized data release
“the most sensitive aspect of APCD implementation,” a fact reflected in
the “variation in policies and practices across states” (Porter et al.
2014: 4). Given this delicate political situation, the APCD Council
initially resisted adopting any single definition of “good” data release
policies; rather, its reports gradually began to embrace a model that
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emphasized multiple data products for a variety of user populations
(Miller et al. 2010). By 2015, the Council's All-Payer Claims Database
Development Manual embraced a more specific set of user-centered
options for data release (APCD Council 2015: 93).8
A second core NAHDO idea that APCD advocates borrowed and
reshaped concerned the kind of data that was necessary to enable
market reform. In the 1990s, NAHDO built a strong reputation for
helping states to create databases of patient discharges from inpatient
hospitals, emergency departments, and ambulatory surgery centers
(Overman and Cahill 1994; Boles and Hicks 1995; Eaton 2013). Yet by
2001, NAHDO leaders argued, “No single data source will likely ever
provide a complete snapshot of health and health system
performance” (Love, Paita, and Custer 2001: 286). Instead, since
service delivery spilled over sites of care and data sources, new
database models should focus on: (1) linking sources of discharge data
with claims data to evaluate patterns of care and document variations
in health practices and outcomes; (2) including data elements that
reflected changes in the marketplace, such as a gradual move to
outpatient settings; and (3) standardizing data elements to enable
valid comparisons across states and care settings (Love, Paita, and
Custer 2001: 285–86).
Advocates of APCDs borrowed on these ideas, arguing that
integrating, updating, and standardizing multiple types of health data
was essential to developing “data-driven health reform efforts
resulting in impacts (including improved access to care, reduced costs,
and improved quality) that can be effectively measured” (Miller et al.
2010: 5). During a meeting held by NAHDO and RAPHIC in 2009,
Denise Love argued that APCDs provided a conceptual model that
could address these issues (NHIHPP 2009: 6). As RAPHIC's Patrick
Miller put it, the concept of the APCD emphasized the inclusion of
common types of data from private or commercial payers, Medicaid,
and Medicare. This concept could be extended to include other
sources, including federal employees, workers’ compensation, and
uninsured claims data. All-payer claims databases also provided a legal
framework for data submission by carriers, third-party administrators,
and pharmacy benefits managers (NHIHPP 2009: 7–8).9 Within a year,
APCD Council issue briefs argued that by linking data from multiple
sources together, claims databases held the potential for a “much
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deeper understanding of patterns, quality, and costs of care across the
entire population” (Miller et al. 2010: 5), and could answer a variety of
questions, including but not limited to: “which hospitals have the
highest prices?”; “which health plan has the best discounts?”; and “are
established clinical guideline measurements related to quality, safety,
and continuity of care being met?” (Miller et al. 2010: 5–6). By 2015,
the Council could claim that APCDs provided the main model used by
states to “fill critical information gaps, promote health care
transparency initiatives, and provide actionable information for their
stakeholders” (APCD Council 2015: 3).

Repurposing Tactical Repertoires: Coalitions,
Resources, and Frames
To deal with institutional barriers to reform, NAHDO also
embraced tactical repertoires that organized multiple coalition partners
in reform, including actors from the business sector, who found it
difficult to mobilize in the absence of a central political entrepreneur
and were likely to be suspicious of state-oriented policy solutions
(Brown 1993; Martin 1993).10 Throughout the 1990s, NAHDO
meetings, workshops, and conferences articulated a distinctive model
of coalition building that relied on consumer and purchaser groups
(Overman and Cahill 1994; Eaton 2013: 92). A frequently cited
example of this model is a 1986 effort by health reformers in
Pennsylvania, including State Rep. Mark Cohen (D–Philadelphia).
Initially, Cohen had pushed for a “truth-in-treatment” list of hospital
prices, which would be published regularly in newspapers, but ran into
opposition from hospital associations that ultimately undermined the
initiative (Regulating Health Care Costs 1985). Undaunted, Cohen
courted support from employers, labor unions, and officials in the
state's Republican administration who were interested in improving the
quality of health data to empower a variety of approaches to cost- and
quality-control beyond price transparency, including utilization control
and patient safety initiatives (Health Care Cost Containment Act 1986;
Overman and Cahill 1994). The result was the adoption in 1986 of a
bipartisan reform, Act 89. While Act 89 created nothing like the price
transparency measures Cohen and his supporters had initially
envisioned, it did require hospitals and ambulatory surgery centers to
provide raw cost and utilization data on all covered medical services to
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a newly created Pennsylvania Health Care Cost Containment Council
(PHC4) made up of state officials, payers, and providers (PHC4 2003).
All-payer claims database advocates repurposed three tactical
repertoires that NAHDO developed in the 1990s (see summary in table
5). First, and perhaps most importantly, the APCD Council repurposed
NAHDO techniques for building support for data reforms among
multiple stakeholders. By the early 2000s, NAHDO leadership had
recognized that persistent provider opposition had hampered even
modest attempts at data collection and dissemination reforms. As one
NAHDO-supported study put it, mandatory data collection systems
“may take years to enact and implement” and may require tradeoffs
with providers during the legislative process that result in “restrictions
in public reporting, such as prohibition of collection or disclosure of
provider-level data” (Consumer-Purchaser Disclosure Project 2004: 7).
By contrast, voluntary systems may “meet with less resistance from
the provider community” but would still allow providers to refuse to
participate, be subject to private “deal-making,” and “lack
transparency in collection and analytic methods” (Consumer-Purchaser
Disclosure Project 2004: 7). To address these concerns, NAHDO
contracted with the Agency for Healthcare Research and Quality
(AHRQ) and the National Opinion Research Center (NORC) to examine
how state discharge databases could be used not only by purchasers
but also by providers and provider associations who had generally
opposed such measures (Schoenman et al. 2005). Their investigation
found numerous examples of how states such as Montana used
administrative data to conduct benchmarking on the “length of stay
and charges for common inpatient diagnoses” (Schoenman et al.
2005: 72). In other states, hospitals used discharge data to satisfy
requirements to report to state disease registries and meet federal
program reporting requirements (Schoenman et al. 2005: 68–77).
Table 5. Tactics Reconfigured by APCD Council
“Raw Material”

Influence on APCD
Development

How APCD Council
Reconfigured

Building coalitions around
multipurpose datasets.

Model for coalition
Expanded coalition to build
building with consumer, support for collecting,
purchaser groups.
disseminating claims data.

Facilitating transfer of
Network of partners for Used network to diffuse new
capacity between federal
policy planning,
policy model, integrate data
and state agencies, among development.
sources, advocate for metadata
states.
standards.
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“Raw Material”

Influence on APCD
Development

How APCD Council
Reconfigured

Deploying evidence on the Rationale for new states Built consensus on core data
benefits of standard health to emulate existing
elements with technical
data policies across state
policies.
advisory panel.
lines.

Thus, by the time RAPHIC was formed, its members had
examples of how to build coalitions around multipurpose datasets, a
repertoire they began to use to build support for the APCD model
(NHIHPP 2009; Wadhwa 2010). As one APCD advocate in Oregon later
put it, “NAHDO meetings and webinars laid the foundation” for
coalition-building efforts (Kolmer 2013: 12). Using the language of
software development, APCD advocates began to suggest that state
leaders engage with stakeholders to develop a set of “use cases,” or
concrete examples, of “what questions APCDs will answer for which
stakeholders,” which would ultimately become part of a “showcase” on
the council's website (APCD Council 2015: 17). These use cases helped
APCD advocates to expand the number of potential stakeholders to
include state legislators, executive agencies, and providers (see table
6). For example, since health care providers had “historically felt that
claims data and billing practices are not accurate enough to support
reporting at the individual or provider level,” the All-Payer Claims
Database Development Manual provided examples of states that
initially reported data at higher levels of aggregation than individual
providers to address concerns about data quality. The APCD Council's
publications also illustrated how providers used claims data from the
New Hampshire Accountable Care Project to analyze regional-level
reporting on cost, utilization, and disease characteristics (Porter and
Love 2013; APCD Council 2015).
Table 6. Common APCD Stakeholders and Concerns
Stakeholder

Concerns

Approach to Addressing Concerns

Policy makers

Cost and
infrastructure
requirements;
safeguards.

Stakeholder engagement; identify
diversified funding structure, build off
existing systems and legislation for data
collection.

Payers

Burden of data
submission;
disclosure of
negotiated rates.

Include payers at the beginning,
throughout APCD cycle, use existing
standards to minimize data collection
burden, establish protocols for release.
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Stakeholder

Concerns

Approach to Addressing Concerns

Providers

Believe that claims
data are inaccurate
for assessing value.

Include providers in stakeholder
meetings; use higher level of
aggregation than individual providers to
address concerns about data quality at
the individual provider level, initially.

Employers

Benchmarks for
consumer-friendly
price transparency.

Include employers in stakeholder
groups, specify requirements of
reporting entities.

State agencies

Maximizing use of
APCD data and
oversight.

Establish memoranda of understanding,
data use agreements.

Consumers

Benchmarks for
consumer-friendly
price transparency;
privacy.

Include consumers in stakeholder
groups, create robust data safeguards.

Health information
Technical barriers to
exchanges (HIE) and linking data.
Health insurance
exchanges (HIX)
Source: APCD Council (2015)

Include HIE and HIX leadership in APCD
stakeholder groups.

A second tactic the APCD Council borrowed from NAHDO was
facilitating the transfer of resources both among states and between
states and federal agencies. Throughout the 1980s, advocates of
health data reform lacked the resources, expertise, or professional
credentials to convince potential stakeholders that access to hospital
cost and utilization data would be worth the trouble to collect
(Imershein, Rond, and Mathis 1992). Yet, soon after NAHDO's creation
in 1986, the organization initiated efforts to share resources with
reformers with little planning capacity of their own, allowing states
with few resources to connect with states that offered to share
computer code, access to data servers, and linkages with high-quality
vendors (Eaton 2013). By the early 2000s, NAHDO had also become a
clearinghouse for measurement tools that illustrated the value of
health data sharing and dissemination policies (Love, Paita, and Custer
2001: 282–84). In 2007, for example, NAHDO assisted advocates of
new health data legislation by publishing reports on how states with
similar fiscal and political scenarios, including South Carolina, had
benefited from implementing a patient-level statewide reporting
system (NAHDO 2007: 15–17). NAHDO also facilitated states’ access
to policy planning capacity that existed in federal agencies. In the
1990s, the organization acquired funding for the development of
inventories of state data elements from AHCPR (later AHRQ) for the
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creation of statewide health databases (NAHDO 1997). Using grants
from AHRQ's Building Research Infrastructure and Capacity program,
NAHDO assisted eligible states in the development of data
clearinghouses, communications modules, and health quality indicators
(AHRQ 2001). Under the auspices of AHRQ's Healthcare Cost and
Utilization Project, NAHDO also secured capacity to conduct research
on the obstacles of collecting and improving outpatient datasets, and
to identify technical and organizational priorities in the development of
national outpatient data standards (NAHDO 2005; Andrews 2013).
The APCD Council adapted the capacity-sharing tactic to build
and diffuse its core database model (Costello and Taylor 2011; Love
and Sullivan 2011; Love and Sachs 2013; Porter et al. 2014). Through
a variety of mechanisms, including a Technical Advisory Panel, the
Council made key links to insurers such as WellPoint, policy
professionals at the National Association of Insurance Commissioners,
elected officials at the National Conference of State Legislatures, and
members of standards development organizations (see table 7). These
stakeholders became critical to the Council's consensus-building
process. Prior to issuing its recommendations for standardizing APCD
data formats, for example, the Council spent over a year conducting
sessions with these organizations and gaining their input on the final
set of recommendations (Love 2011). State governors identified
opportunities for making the “business case for why [an APCD] helps
the state” and demonstrating that the data APCDs proposed to collect
“match[ed] state priorities” (Finnegan 2010: 6). Further, the Council
drew on support from AHRQ, which began to promote APCD Council
metadata standards through its US Health Information Knowledgebase
(USHIK) (Chudy 2010; Fitzmaurice 2010).
Table 7. Examples of National Organizations Linked to the APCD Council
Federal agencies: Agency for Healthcare Research and Quality (AHRQ), Centers for
Medicare & Medicaid Services (CMS), Centers for Disease Control and Prevention
National Center for Health Statistics (CDC/NCHS), HHS Office of the Assistant
Secretary for Planning and Evaluation (ASPE).
National associations of state officials: National Association of Health Data
Organizations (NAHDO), National Governors Association (NGA), National Association
of Insurance Commissioners (NAIC), National Conference of State Legislatures
(NCSL), National Association of Medicaid Directors (NAMD).
Standards development organizations: Accredited Standards Committee X12
(ASC X12), National Council for Prescription Drug Programs (NCPDP).
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Insurance industry: America's Health Insurance Plans (AHIP), UnitedHealth Group,
WellPoint, Kaiser Permanente, Aetna.
Academic/research: AcademyHealth, University of New Hampshire.
Philanthropy: Commonwealth Fund, Gary and Mary West Center, Robert Wood
Johnson Foundation.
Source: APCD Council (2011); Love (2011)
Note: List is not exhaustive.

A final NAHDO tactic that the APCD Council repurposed was
identifying the benefits of standardizing data policies across state
lines. Since NAHDO's founding, its leaders carefully monitored
variations in state health data policies (NAHDO 1989). In 1990 and
1991, for example, NAHDO surveyed states to ask what data they
collected on health costs as well as its accessibility to consumers and
insurers (Boles and Hicks 1995). The report based on these surveys
illustrated two important contrasts between advanced states such as
Pennsylvania—the only state that collected and published reports using
mortality data—and states such as Indiana, which provided data only
on hospital charges and service volume, and Delaware, which provided
data to the public but only after a lengthy and costly approval process.
As a 1991 Health Affairs article that reported on the “sorely needed”
NAHDO study suggested: “the average consumer and even the fairly
sophisticated employee benefits manager, unless they choose their
state very carefully, may be out of luck” (Singer 1991: 151). From
these surveys NAHDO issued periodic reports such as A Guide to
State-Level Ambulatory Healthcare Data Collection, which outlined
states’ response to the health care system's shift from inpatient to
outpatient care (NAHDO 1997). Rather than lay out a clear series of
policy recommendations, however, the report billed itself as a “firsttime-ever attempt to gather and produce information” on patient-level
data collection activities in numerous outpatient settings (NAHDO
1997: 1). Perhaps even more importantly, surveys, state scorecards,
and reports that analyzed differences among states built political
tension by publicizing heterogeneity. Throughout the 1990s and
2000s, NAHDO continued to produce reports that publicized the
imbalance between state transparency frameworks and the need for
reform. In 2007, for example, NAHDO leveraged interstate disparities
in health costs to persuade state legislators in Mississippi that
developing a comprehensive data collection system would dramatically
bring down state health spending (NAHDO 2007: 14).

Journal of Health Politics, Policy and Law, Vol 42, No. 1 (February 2017): pg. 5-52. DOI. This article is © Duke University
Press and permission has been granted for this version to appear in e-Publications@Marquette. Duke University Press
does not grant permission for this article to be further copied/distributed or hosted elsewhere without the express
permission from Duke University Press.

23

NOT THE PUBLISHED VERSION; this is the author’s final, peer-reviewed manuscript. The published version may be
accessed by following the link in the citation at the bottom of the page.

Members of the APCD Council repurposed this tactic. To be sure,
advocates of APCDs recognized the importance of illustrating the
benefits of a standardized policy model that would minimize
inequitable geographic operational costs. They frequently used
examples of how standardizing APCD data requirements across states
“creates efficiency in terms of getting the information (from the data)
back to the providers and the consumers for decision making” (NHIHPP
2009: 16). Yet, at the same time, Council reports emphasized that
varying coalitions and policy constraints across states might lead to
different analysis and reporting tools as well as unique mixes of data
elements (APCD Council 2015: 48). To circumvent these challenges,
the Council staged meetings with national organizations to develop
consensus across all fifty states “to ensure that states collecting the
same data would do so in the same manner” (Costello and Taylor
2011: 2). Supported by AHIP and an AHRQ task order in 2009 and
2010, the Council formed a Technical Advisory Panel made up of state
and federal policy makers, payers, and provider groups (see table 7)
(APCD Council 2011). The result of these meetings was a capacious
set of common data elements that APCDs would include, such as
procedure codes, diagnoses, and payment amounts (APCD Council,
UNH, and NAHDO 2012). To facilitate the diffusion of these standards,
the Council partnered with the Accredited Standards Committee X12
(ASC X12) to develop a Uniform Medical Claims Payer Reporting
Standard and data reporting implementation guides (APCD Council
2011; ASC X12 2012). Standardizing claims data reporting, as the
Council's Patrick Miller put it, would “result in lowered administrative
costs for payers, enable states to more easily share data between
them, provide predictability for vendors, states, and payers on data
layouts, and provide a public forum for the addition of new data
elements as APCDs evolve nationally to meet state transparency and
national health reform needs” (ASC X12 2011).

Reassembling Health Data Infrastructure: Laws,
Databases, and Organizations
In addition to reshaping ideas and tactical repertoires for
information-based health policy instruments, advocates of APCDs
reassembled three types of existing legal and technical infrastructures
that NAHDO had been instrumental in building in the late 1980s and
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1990s (see summary in table 8). While these existing laws and
databases were designed for a variety of purposes, the APCD model
showed how these disparate data sources could be stitched together to
address gaps in the knowledge of policy makers, consumers, and
purchasers about “how and where health care dollars are being spent”
(Miller et al. 2010: 5).
Table 8. Infrastructures Reconfigured by APCD Council
“Raw Material”

Influence on APCD
Development

How APCD Council
Reconfigured

State health data
legislation (e.g., PA Act
89).

Precedent and institutional Drafted new legislation to
framework for all-payer
expand sites, populations
reforms.
covered by health data laws.

State and federal
databases (e.g.,
Washington State
VistaPHw).

Technical and
Developed new technical
organizational capacity for model for collecting,
database development.
managing, and disseminating
data.

State data agencies (e.g., Organizational capacity for Developed new organizational
Maine Health Data
database development.
model to support APCDs.
Organization).

A first important infrastructure the APCD Council reassembled
was a diverse set of laws that required health care providers and
payers to disclose health information. Legislation enabling state
governments to collect health data from providers and payers emerged
sporadically in the 1970s and 1980s, growing significantly after the
founding of NAHDO in 1986 (see fig. 3). Early reforms included
Certificate of Need laws, which enabled states to collect data on
inpatient hospital stays. Yet states were slow to develop data on costs
and utilization on physician visits, nursing home stays, and ambulatory
care services (NAHDO 1993). By the early 2000s, NAHDO surveys
revealed that virtually all states had some data-collection strategy in
place, but that data collection was largely limited to inpatient
discharges, and often failed to include information on ambulatory
surgical units and emergency departments (NAHDO 2007).
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Figure 3. State Legislative Enactments Supporting Health Data Collection
(Cumulative), 1970–2012 Source: Authors’ tabulation of CPR (2014)

Despite the weaknesses of existing legislative frameworks,
APCD advocates explicitly recognized the importance of building on
what exists rather than “reinventing the wheel.” For example, policy
entrepreneurs in New York maneuvered around organized opponents
by including the measure in 2011 budget legislation and packaging the
measure as an update to the state's Statewide Planning and Research
Cooperative System (SPARCS) which had existed since 1979 but had
not collected financial information on health care services beyond
charges (Senate Bill 2809D 2011; Miller et al. 2015: 2–3). Under the
new proposal, the New York Department of Health began to integrate
SPARCS's discharge data with information on claims and clinical data
from regional health organizations across multiple payers (New York
Department of Health 2015). To support the effort, the APCD Council
monitored the first four years of implementation and provided a series
of recommendations for further adapting routines for stakeholder
engagement and data-quality management (Miller et al. 2015). These
reforms, the Council argued, would help to address political opposition
to the law from payers that saw requirements for data release as an
“unfunded mandate” or a violation of antitrust laws (Miller et al. 2015:
65–66).
Second, APCD advocates built upon an existing physical
infrastructure made up of health databases. Since the 1990s, state
health data organizations had focused their energies on creating
databases that covered information on hospital discharges, which
represented a significant improvement on existing administrative and
employment-based reporting systems’ critical data elements, which
rarely contained significant provider-level information (Schoenman et
al. 2005). These databases were designed to provide raw data to
purchasers or state officials in raw form, and were rarely repackaged
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for consumers, except in occasional consumer guides (Overman and
Cahill 1994).
To implement the new claims database model, the APCD Council
and its members provided guides for how to use and adapt existing
data sources for new purposes (Love 2011; Love and Steiner 2011;
APCD Council 2015). One of the earliest challenges states faced was
ensuring that payer data submissions were complete and accurate. To
address these challenges, states such as Massachusetts worked with
payers to develop manuals to guide the data submission process
(CHIA 2014). To address scrutiny of APCD data quality, officials in
Minnesota also used the statewide hospital discharge database “as a
reference database, benchmarking the APCD with the hospitalization
data for validity checks” (APCD Council 2015: 59). States such as
Colorado, Vermont, and Massachusetts also developed special data use
agreements and user affidavits to deal with restrictions on access to
Medicare and Medicaid data (APCD Council 2015: 52). New Hampshire
also undertook innovations to improve the salience and usability of its
consumer-facing database, which helped to highlight “wide gaps in
provider practices—particularly between hospital outpatient
departments and freestanding facilities” (Tu and Gourevitch 2014: 3).
A final infrastructure that APCD advocates built upon was the
network of state agencies that had long managed hospital discharge
databases. These agencies were often state departments of health or
independent data commissions such as the Pennsylvania Health Care
Cost Containment Council (PHC4) (Love, Paita, and Custer 2001).
While many of these organizations were capable of managing smallscale data projects, most lacked the organizational capacity to take on
large, politically volatile projects such as APCDs, which required a
greater level of expertise and ability to negotiate with multiple
stakeholders. During the early implementation of APCD legislation,
New York's Department of Health, for example, had difficulty carrying
out most claims database functions, and lacked a process for securing
stakeholder support (Miller et al. 2015: 6–7).
To address these challenges, states retooled their existing
organizational structures to buffer APCDs from political conflict. For
instance, rather than housing the APCD in existing state data agencies
or departments of health, states such as Virginia and Colorado created
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independent, nonprofit organizations that allowed data stakeholders to
directly collaborate in decision making (APCD Council 2015: 32).
States such as Vermont and Massachusetts, by contrast, built
collaborative governance into existing independent state agencies
through advisory boards (CHIA 2011; GMCB 2015). Similarly, the
Maine Health Data Organization integrated payers, consumers,
employers, and providers directly into a twenty-one-member policy
board, which oversaw data collection, distribution, analysis, and
rulemaking (Prysunka 2010: 11). In sum, as with databases
themselves, these organizational innovations reworked prior state
infrastructure to support new policies.

Transparency and the New Politics of Prices
The APCD Council's efforts at institutional reconfiguration—
reshaping policy ideas, reassembling existing infrastructures, and
repurposing tactical repertoires—have led to significant changes in the
politics and policy of price transparency. First, by reshaping ideas
about how to improve the effectiveness of information on health
prices, the APCD Council has helped to popularize claims databases as
a critical tool for advocates of payment reform. In 2009, employer
associations concerned with improving the value of health care,
together with the Pacific Business Group on Health and the California
Healthcare Foundation, formed an organization called Catalyst for
Payment Reform (CPR) (CPR 2015). In its mission to drive “robust
changes outside of the Medicare program,” CPR vigorously advocates
for price-transparency legislation to achieve cost savings for
purchasers, support for consumer choices in the health care market,
and reductions in unwanted geographical price variation (CPR 2015).
With high standards for state price-transparency laws, embodied in
annual scorecards, CPR aims to “take a deeper look at whether these
laws were achieving the ultimate goal—ensuring consumers have
access to meaningful information about the price of their health care”
by examining state laws, regulations, and websites (CPR 2014: i).
These scorecards treat APCDs as the “ideal source of data” for price
transparency, in part because they fill in “longstanding gaps” in health
care information (CPR 2014: 6). As a result, CPR's annual scorecard
automatically awards 50 out of 100 points to states that use APCDs as
a data source (CPR 2014: 7).
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Second, the work of transparency advocates has created new
forums in which providers, payers, consumers, and public officials
share ideas related to transparency and build linkages across issues of
cost and quality. Philanthropic foundations have been powerful, yet
quiet, partners in this effort (Alcalde 2015; Oakman 2015). In 2013
and 2015, the Robert Wood Johnson Foundation hosted a National
Healthcare Transparency Summit in Washington, DC generated
information about alternative transparency innovations embraced by
both Democrats and Republicans as well as every major transparency
stakeholder group in the country (National Summit on Health Care
Price, Cost and Quality Transparency 2015). News coverage of the
summits reveals a shift in providers’ attitudes toward transparency. As
the president of one state medical society who attended the 2015
summit suggested, “physicians have a reputation for being difficult,”
but they are the “most natural and best partners to lead the
transparency movement because no one else is as closely aligned with
patient needs. . . . Physicians are now being asked in many cases to
not only be responsible for delivering high quality healthcare, but
they're being asked how we should be delivering high quality
healthcare at the most appropriate cost possible” (Firth 2015).
Third, by reassembling existing legal and technical
infrastructures, the APCD Council has assisted in the implementation
of payment reform alternatives such as Accountable Care
Organizations (ACOs), which depend on integrated, real-time data on
provider performance and outcomes (Fulton et al. 2015; Shortell et al.
2015). Massachusetts, for example, is leveraging its APCD as a data
source to support an ACO initiative under a federal State Innovation
Model grant (EOHHS 2013: 26). In 2011, the New Hampshire Institute
for Health Policy and Practice received a Robert Wood Johnson
Foundation grant to use the state's APCD to create quality metrics
(Heller, Hoffman, and Bindman 2014: 672). These researchers also
used the APCD to evaluate how well statewide ACO projects controlled
per-member costs (Porter and Love 2013).
Finally, the APCD Council's tactical repertoire has also permitted
the development of a broader coalition behind price transparency
reforms at the state level. Consumer groups such as Families USA
argue that “states can play a pivotal role in improving price
transparency” and that “moving forward, states should consider taking
Journal of Health Politics, Policy and Law, Vol 42, No. 1 (February 2017): pg. 5-52. DOI. This article is © Duke University
Press and permission has been granted for this version to appear in e-Publications@Marquette. Duke University Press
does not grant permission for this article to be further copied/distributed or hosted elsewhere without the express
permission from Duke University Press.

29

NOT THE PUBLISHED VERSION; this is the author’s final, peer-reviewed manuscript. The published version may be
accessed by following the link in the citation at the bottom of the page.

steps to improve consumer access to meaningful price and quality
information” (Families USA 2014: 10). Insurers now publicly advocate
for “a parsimonious set of meaningful and useful” provider
performance indicators that expand transparency in cost beyond public
programs (Kramer 2013: 1). Most importantly, while provider groups
remain concerned about inaccuracies of individual-level cost data, the
American Hospital Association now argues that “state governments,
working with their state hospital associations, should expand existing
efforts to make hospital charge information available to consumers”
(AHA 2014b: 2).
Evidence that this broad coalition can act collectively can be
found in the case of Gobeille v. Liberty Mutual Insurance Company
(577 U.S. ___ [2016]), in which Vermont's APCD attempted to
overturn a Second Circuit ruling that the Employee Retirement Income
Security Act (ERISA) preempts state data submission requirements for
employer-sponsored self-insured health plans (Lacey 2015). Vermont's
petition received support in the form of amicus briefs from a crosscutting set of over twenty stakeholders (SCOTUSblog 2015). These
briefs were filed not only by NAHDO, the APCD Council, and numerous
organizations of state officials (including the NGA and the NAIC), but
also the American Medical Association and the American Hospital
Association, both of which argued that APCDs are a critical component
of their efforts to develop and use health data to improve patient
outcomes (AHA and AAMC 2015; AMA and VMS 2015). By contrast,
only one amicus brief—whose coauthors included the ERISA Industry
Committee, AHIP, and the US Chamber of Commerce—was filed in
favor of Liberty Mutual (SCOTUSblog 2015).
As could be expected given the Supreme Court's tendency to
expansively interpret ERISA preemption, the justices did not readily
side with APCD advocates. In a 6–2 opinion authored by Justice
Kennedy, the Court held that ERISA preempts Vermont's statute as
applied to self-insured plans because it regulates the collection of plan
information, which is a key facet of plan administration (Gobeille v.
Liberty Mutual Insurance Company). In the aftermath of this decision,
APCD advocates may still be able to rely on their existing repertoire of
coalition building to overcome this policy roadblock. This is particularly
true given the support APCD advocates have sought and received from
numerous key stakeholders as well as federal officials, including in the
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Department of Labor, which the Gobeille majority ruled is alone
authorized to administer the reporting requirements of ERISA plans,
and supported the United States’ amicus brief for Vermont
(Rosenbaum 2016). As Justice Breyer's concurrence suggests, states
may be able to petition to develop ERISA reporting requirements that
meets states’ needs or delegate some authority to states to obtain
such data. In July 2016, the Employee Benefits Security Administration
also proposed a rule eliminating provisions that exempted small, selfinsured group health plans from filing Form 5500 (Jost 2016). While
this form does not collect the kind of detailed information required by
APCDs, the rule may signal the continued interest in promoting data
collection on the part of the broad, intergovernmental coalition built by
APCD advocates thus far (Newman 2016).

Conclusion
Our study suggests that there has been a significant shift in
state-level efforts to address the problem of rising health care prices.
During the 1980s and 1990s, rate-setting regimes ran into political
and institutional barriers that existed at the state level (McDonough
1997a, b; Hackey 1998). While existing scholarship helps to explain
the breakdown of these regimes, we show that a new policy model has
emerged in their place which emphasizes the role of health data
transparency as a necessary component of reform and uses APCDs as
a key policy instrument. The rise of APCDs, we suggest, emerged from
a process of institutional reconfiguration (Berk and Galvan 2013; Berk,
Galvan, and Hattam 2013). To address political and institutional
barriers to reform, APCD advocates leveraged an existing network of
health data experts at NAHDO. The APCD Council built on and
reshaped NAHDO policy ideas about when transparency reforms work;
repurposed tactical repertoires such as capacity borrowing to shore up
APCD efforts in states with few resources; and reassembled existing
legislation, databases, and state data agencies to cope with
technological hurdles and political opposition to transparency
initiatives.
The Council's efforts have made states into viable sites for
price-transparency reforms, and have made APCDs a key instrument
in those reforms. The political success of APCDs notwithstanding,
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however, recent research suggests that the effect of transparency on
prices is conditional at best (Austin and Gravelle 2007).11 Two reasons
for this are worth highlighting here. First, transparency alone cannot
address the persistent problem of noncompetitive health care markets.
For example, since the implementation of a strong transparency
regime, New Hampshire faced difficulty in reducing prices, in part
because of a highly uncompetitive hospital marketplace (Tu and
Gourevitch 2014). Second, as Cutler and Dafny (2011) argue,
transparency can also incentivize hospitals to raise their prices,
especially in markets where insurers have fewer exit options.12 Despite
these limitations to price transparency, there is evidence that greater
attention to prices by political leaders can affect market outcomes.
Ellison and Wolfram (2006) have, for instance, found evidence that
political attention to the Clinton health reform initiative led to a
dramatic decrease in prescription drug price growth in the 1990s.
Thus, fulfilling the promise of price transparency reforms may, as Weil
et al. (2006) argue, require that the information they generate
becomes embedded in the everyday routines of political actors rather
than market participants alone.
Beyond the case of APCDs, this study has implications for how
we understand the relationship between American federalism and
health care reform. As scholars such as McDonough (1997a, b),
Hackey (1998), Barrilleaux and Brace (2007), and Gray, Lowery, and
Benz (2013) suggest, states experience fiscal, institutional, and
political constraints that make it difficult to drive significant health
policy innovation. At the same time, a variety of scholars have
suggested that states often play a key role as policy laboratories,
capable of experimenting with and diffusing robust health care reforms
(Sparer, France, and Clinton 2011; Thompson 2012). In contrast to
both of these perspectives, our pragmatist account suggests that
states’ ability to serve as laboratories for health care reform is highly
conditional on whether or not policy entrepreneurs mine state
experiences of public policy to distill lessons about “what works,” and
reassemble promising policy ideas, tactical repertoires, and
infrastructures into policy models that have a higher likelihood of
success (Berk, Galvan, and Hattam 2013; Heller, Hoffman, and
Bindman 2014). All-payer claims database advocates relied on NAHDO
as an available source of knowledge on ideas, tactics, and
infrastructures. Yet, unlike entrepreneurs in Kingdon's (1984) multiple
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streams framework, these reformers did not simply use available
materials in “raw” form. Rather, they redeployed raw materials—
reshaping old ideas, repurposing existing tactics, and reassembling
existing databases and state laws—to support a new policy goal. Had
the transparency advocates not had access to these raw materials, or
if they had viewed states as poor venues for reform, it is unlikely the
APCDs would have emerged when and how they did.
By uncovering how institutional reconfiguration led to the
emergence of APCDs, our study also suggests several future directions
for research on the politics of health care reform. Rather than
proposing to test the effect of institutional structures such as
federalism or bicameralism on health policy innovations, future
research should catalogue the practices that successful (and
unsuccessful) policy entrepreneurs deploy across a variety of
institutional settings. In particular, further studies should explore the
extent to which institutional reconfiguration helps to explain health
policy change. Because policy innovation is frequently about creating
something new based on existing intellectual and institutional
resources, reconfiguration is a major form of agency in the policy
process (Campbell 2004; Carstensen 2011). So far, little has been
written about the role of reconfiguration in health care reform or in the
context of federalism more broadly. The results of this study suggest
that future research on health care and federalism should pay greater
attention to this process of institutional change.
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Appendix
Appendix A
Documents Analyzed (N = 33)

Title

Author(s)

Date

Manual/Guidebook (N = 6)
All-Payer Claims Database Development
Manual: Establishing a Foundation for Health
Care Transparency and Informed Decision
Making

Jo Porter, Denise Love, 2015
Amy Costello, Ashley
Peters, Barbara
Rudolph

Model All-Payer Claims Database Legislation

Lucy Hodder, Jo Porter, 2015
Ashley Peters

Recommendations for Collecting Payer
Information on Plan Benefit Design and
Payments to Providers for Non-Claims based
Services

APCD Council, NHIHPP, 2014
NAHDO

Developing an APCD Request for Proposal:
Guidance for States

Denise Love, Jane
Sachs

2013

APCD Technical Build Guidance Document

Denise Love, Alan
Prysunka

2011

Cost and Funding Considerations for a
Statewide All-Payer Claims Database (APCD)

Denise Love, Emily
Sullivan

2011

Analysis of Past APCD Efforts (N = 4)
New York's All-Payer Database: A New Lens
for Consumer Transparency

Patrick Miller, Ashley
2015
Peters, Jo Porter, Emily
Sullivan

APCD Legislation: Review of Current Practices Patrick Miller, Ashley
and Critical Elements
Peters

2013

Key State Health Care Databases for
Improving Health Care Delivery

Denise Love, Claudia
Steiner

2011

All-Payer Claims Databases: State Initiatives
to Improve Health Care Transparency

Denise Love, William
Custer, Patrick Miller

2010

Issue Brief or Fact Sheet (N = 9)
The Basics of All-Payer Claims Databases: A
Primer for States

Jo Porter, Denise Love, 2014
Ashley Peters, Jane
Sachs, and Amy
Costello

A Stewardship Framework for the Use of
Community Health Data

Larry Green

2012

Why State All-Payer Claims Databases Matter Patrick Miller
to Employers

2012

APCD 2.0: The Next Evolution

2011

Patrick Miller
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Title

Author(s)

Date

Fact Sheet: APCD and Health Reform

Jo Porter

2011

Standardization of Data Collection in All-Payer Amy Costello, Mary
Claims Databases
Taylor

2011

All-Payer Claims Databases: An Overview for
Policymakers

Patrick Miller, Denise
Love, Emily Sullivan,
Josephine Porter, Amy
Costello

2010

All-Payer Claims Database Fact Sheet

Alan Prysunka

2010

All-Payer Claims Databases: A Key to
Healthcare Reform

Suffolk University Law
School

2009

Other (N = 3)
History of APCD Council Harmonization Efforts APCD Council

2011

Proposal for State Access to Medicare: Letter
to Senator Baucus

Denise Love

2009

Proposal for State Access to Medicare: Letter
to Senator Grassley

Denise Love

2009

Webinars (N = 11)
AHRQ Webinar—Improving Cost Transparency AHRQ
and Quality of Care: APCDs Working for You Lessons Learned in the Release of APCD
Analytics—July 8, 2015

2015

APCD Council Innovative Uses of APCDs, Part
2—May 18, 2015

APCD Council

2015

APCD Council APCD Development Manual
Overview—March 31, 2015

APCD Council

2015

AHRQ Webinar—Improving Cost Transparency AHRQ
and Quality of Care: APCDs Working for You—
March 19, 2015

2015

APCD Council Innovative Uses of APCDs, Part
1—March 9, 2015

APCD Council

2015

APCD Council Provider Identification
Webinar—May 2, 2014

APCD Council

2014

APCD Council Risk Adjustment and Rate
Review Webinar—April 10, 2014

APCD Council

2014

APCD Council Overview Webinar—November
15, 2013

APCD Council

2013

NAHDO All-Payer Claims Database (APCD)
Overview and Applications for Public Health
Presentation—March 17, 2011

NAHDO

2011

CDC Surveillance Science Advisory Group
Webinar—January 27, 2011

CDC

2011
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Title

Author(s)

AHRQ-USHIK, NAHDO, and the APCD Council: AHRQ, NAHDO, APCD
New State Tool Support Webinar—December Council
8, 2010

Date
2010

Appendix B
Documents Not Included in Analysis (N = 27)
Title

Author(s)

Date

State Models for Health Care Cost Measurement: A
Policy and Operational Framework

Rachel Block

2015

Multi-Payer Claims Database/Task 12: Summary
Report and Recommended Design Option

Avalere Health

2010

Moving Markets: Lessons from New Hampshire's
Health Care Price Transparency Experiment

Ha Tu, Rebecca Gourevitch 2014

State of the States: Laying the Foundation for
Health Reform

State Coverage Initiatives

2011

Releasing Medicare Claims Data to Support Quality
Improvement Initiatives: Legal Barriers and
Opportunities

Jane Hyatt Thorpe, Erica
Pereira, Sara Rosenbaum

2010

Impact of Health Care Price Transparency on Price
Variation: The New Hampshire Experience

Ha Tu, Johanna Lauer

2009

The Impact of Price Transparency on HealthCost
Services in New Hampshire

New Hampshire Insurance 2009
Department

Report on the Impact of House Bill 790 – An Act
Relative to Dependent Coverage for Health
Insurance 2007 Session

New Hampshire Insurance 2008
Department

2007–2011 Vermont Health Care Cost and
Utilization Report

HCCI

2014

CIVHC State Agency vs. Qualified Entity Comparison CIVHC
Document

2014

Vermont's Analytic Methodology

HCCI

2014

Examination of Health Care Cost Trends and Cost
Drivers

Office of Attorney General, 2011
Martha Coakley

State Data Spotlight: Maine's Health Care Claims
Database

SHADAC

A Commercial Insurance Study of Vaginal Delivery
and Cesarean Section Rates at New Hampshire
Hospitals

New Hampshire Insurance 2011
Department

A Study of Ground Ambulance Transport
Commercial Claims Data

New Hampshire Insurance 2011
Department

The Impact of Aging on Medical Care Services
Covered by Commercial Insurance in New
Hampshire

New Hampshire Insurance 2010
Department

A Study of NH vs. Out of State Medical Care
Spending and Carrier Differences

New Hampshire Insurance 2010
Department

2011
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Title

Author(s)

Report: Tri-State Variation in Health Services
Karl Finison
Utilization & Expenditures in Northern New England
Payments to Providers: An Inside Look at Carrier
Discounts

Date
2010

New Hampshire Insurance 2010
Department

New Hampshire Acute Care Hospital Comparison: A New Hampshire Insurance 2008
Commercial Insurance Relative Cost Comparison
Department
Report on Patient Contributions to Medical Expenses New Hampshire Insurance 2008
Department
All-Payer Claims Databases: Unlocking the Potential Rebecca Paradis, Erin
Bartolini

2014

Why State All-Payer Claims Databases Matter to
Employers

Patrick Miller

2012

Standardization of Data Collection in All-Payer
Claims Databases

Amy Costello, Mary Taylor 2011

Collecting Health Data

National Conference of
State Legislatures

2010

Analysis of HHS Proposed Rules on Reinsurance,
Risk Corridors, and Risk Adjustment

Wakely Consulting Group

2011

Overview of the Multi-Payer Claims Database
(MPCD)

OptumInsight

2011

Footnotes
1

2
3
4

5

6

7

8

According to the World Health Organization, in the United States, per capita
expenditures reached $8,895 in 2012:
www.who.int/countries/usa/en/.
On the definition of policy instrument, see Lascoumes and Le Gales (2007).
For examples of capacity borrowing outside health policy, see Evans (2011).
As Amberg (2013: 104) puts it, “Reformers . . . create a discursive context
in which agents can imagine how to recombine their relationships in
ways that could make them more effective in the new context than
they were in the old.”
For another example of how states creatively use available resources in the
context of health policy, see Heller, Hoffman, and Bindman (2014).
For a lists of documents analyzed and of those not included in analysis, see
Appendixes A and B.
To be sure, there have always been multiple rationales for requiring the
disclosure of health data, yet the market rationale, as Sage (1999)
suggests, is the one most commonly articulated.
These standards included structured reports for common data requests,
customized user reports created for specific employer groups or
providers, web query systems for consumers and purchasers,
transparency websites that post median prices for common procedures
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by facilities and/or payers, as well as files designed specifically for
researchers.
9
Miller also provided examples of how New Hampshire's APCD, by including
outpatient claims, captured important indicators that reflected changes
in the health market (NHIHPP 2009: 11–12).
10
Business allies were particularly likely to be suspicious about arguments
focused on prices rather than service volume as contributing to health
care costs (see White 2011).
11
But see Wu et al. (2014).
12
See also Kyle and Ridley (2007).
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